Rajeev Tyago and Jagmohan Raju (Working), The Effect of Entrant Brand Ownership on National Brand Positioning Strategies, Managerial and Decision Economics.
Yuxin Chen, Yogesh Joshi, Jagmohan Raju, Z. John Zhang (Forthcoming), A Theory of Combative Advertising, Marketing Science, 2006.
Andre Bonfrer and Jagmohan Raju (Working), CEO Succession and its Impact on Competitive Behavior.
Upender Subramanian, Jagmohan Raju, Z. John Zhang (Working), Customer Value Based Management: Competitive Implications.
Abstract: Many ?firms today quantify the value of individual customers and serve them differentially; providing better service, prices and other inducements to high value customers. We refer to this practice as Customer Value-based Management (CVM). While previous research and popular press has strongly advocated CVM, ?firms have often met with mixed results. One possible reason why actual outcomes differ from anticipated results could be that ?firms often implement CVM in a competitive environment. Our objective is to study CVM explicitly in a competitive setting. We find that while some recommendations and prescriptions from past research continue to apply in a competitive environment, some others do not. For example, we find that one of the benefits of CVM in a competitive setting is that it can discourage the rival from competing intensely, by increasing the rival’s chances of acquiring unprofitable customers. In this context, low-value customers can play an important strategic role by limiting the intensity of rival’s poaching. Consequently, ?firing low value customers or even increasing their value may prove counter-productive.
Rajeev Tyagi and Jagmohan Raju (Working), Preemptive National Brand Positioning Strategies Response Store Brand Entry.
S. Sajeesh and Jagmohan Raju (Working), Cost Leadership, Differentiation and Niche Strategies: Impact on Positioning and Pricing.
Jagmohan Raju and Z. John Zhang, Smart Pricing (:, 2009)
Tony Cui, Jagmohan Raju, Z. John Zhang (2008), A Price-Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions, Marketing Science.
Abstract: Critics have long faulted the wide-spread practice of trade promotions as wasteful. It has been estimated that this practice adds up to $100 billion worth of inventory to the distribution system. Yet, the practice continues. In this paper, we propose a price discrimination model of trade promotions. We show that in a distribution channel characterized by a dominant retailer, a manufacturer has incentives to price discriminate between the dominant retailer and smaller independents. While offering all retailers the same pricing policy, price discrimination can be implemented through trade promotions because they induce different inventoryordering behaviors on the part of retailers. Differences in inventory holding costs have been shown to be an important determinant of consumer promotions. Our analysis suggests that differences in holding costs are also potentially an important driver for the use of trade promotions. The implications from our model explain a number of anecdotal and /or empirically observed puzzles about how trade promotions are practiced. For example, our analysis explains why chain stores welcome trade promotions but independents do not. Our analysis outlines implications for managing trade promotions.
Musalem, Andres, Eric Bradlow, Jagmohan Raju (2008), Bayesian Estimation of Random-Coefficients Choice Models using Aggregate Data, Journal of Applied Econometrics, To appear.
Abstract: This article discusses the use of Bayesian methods for estimating logit demand models using aggregate data. We analyze two different demand systems: independent samples and consumer panel. Under the first system, there is a different and independent random sample of N consumers in each period and each consumer makes only a single purchase decision. Under the second system, the same N consumers make a purchase decision in each of T periods. Interestingly, there exists an asymptotic link between these two systems, which has important implications for the estimation of these demand models. The proposed methods are illustrated using simulated and real data.
Tony Cui, Jagmohan Raju, Z. John Zhang (2007), Fairness and Channel Coordination, Management Science, August 2007.
Abstract: We incorporate the concept of fairness in a conventional dyadic channel to investigate how fairness may affect channel coordination. We show that when channel members are concerned about fairness, the manufacturer can use a simple wholesale price above her marginal cost to coordinate this channel both in terms of achieving the maximum channel profit and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility. Thus, channel coordination may not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do.
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