Ulrich Doraszelski, Joseph Harrington, Mark Satterthwaite (Work In Progress), Can Collusion Be Sustained Under Demand Uncertainty and Entry and Exit?.
Bryan Bollinger, Ulrich Doraszelski, Kenneth Judd, Ryan McDevitt (2024), The Timing and Location of Entry in Growing Markets: Subgame Perfection at Work, , Rand Journal of Economics, 55 (2), pp. 169-198.
Ulrich Doraszelski, Joao F. Gomes, Felix Nockher, Oligopoly dynamics with Financing Frictions.
Ulrich Doraszelski and Jordi Jaumandreu, Reexamining the De Loecker & Warzynski (2012) method for estimating markups.
David Besanko, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yaroslav Kryukov (2020), Sacrifice tests for predation in a dynamic pricing model: Ordover & Willig (1981) and Cabral & Riordan (1997) meet Ericson & Pakes (1995), International Journal of Industrial Organization , 70 (), pp. 1-20.
David Besanko, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yaroslav Kryukov (2019), How Efficient is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment, American Economic Review , 109 (9), pp. 3339-3364.
Ulrich Doraszelski and Jordi Jaumandreu (Working), Using Cost Minimization to Estimate Markups.
Juan Escobar and Ulrich Doraszelski (2019), Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games, Theoretical Economics, 14 (), pp. 597-646.
Ulrich Doraszelski, Katja Seim, Michael Sinkinson, Will Peichun Wang (Forthcoming), Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction.
Abstract: We explore the sensitivity of the U.S. government's ongoing incentive auction to multi-license ownership by broadcasters. We document significant broadcast TV license purchases by private equity firms prior to the auction and perform a prospective analysis of the effect of ownership concentration on auction outcomes. We find that multi-license holders are able to raise spectrum acquisition costs by 22% by strategically withholding some of their licenses to increase the price for their remaining licenses. A proposed remedy reduces the distortion in payouts to license holders by up to 80%, but lower participation could greatly increase payouts and exacerbate strategic effects.
Ulrich Doraszelski and Kenneth Judd (2019), Dynamic Stochastic Games with Random Moves, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 17 (1), pp. 59-79.