Ulrich Doraszelski

Ulrich Doraszelski
  • Department Chair of Business Economics and Public Policy
  • Joseph J. Aresty Professor
  • Professor of Economics
  • Professor of Marketing

Contact Information

  • office Address:

    333 Dinan Hall (formerly Vance Hall)
    3733 Spruce Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19104

Research Interests: Industrial Organization, Numerical Methods, Game Theory, Applied Econometrics

Links: CV

Overview

Ulrich Doraszelski is the Joseph J. Aresty Professor and Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also a Professor of Economics at the School of Arts and Sciences and a Professor of Marketing at the Wharton School. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University in 2001. Professor Doraszelski has previously been a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a faculty member of the Department of Economics at Harvard University. He currently serves as Associate Editor for Operations Research. He previously served as Co-Editor for the International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Professor Doraszelski’s research identifies and explains the long-run impact of firms’ strategic decisions on the evolution of an industry. Many decisions such as investments in capacity and research and development are long-lived and affect both current and future profitability. They also have profound consequences for the competitive position of a firm vis-a-vis its rivals and shape the structure of the industry. These changes in industry structure in turn affect the future decisions of firms. Professor Doraszelski’s overarching research interest is to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, this two-way link between firms’ strategic decisions and the evolution of the industry over time.

Professor Doraszelski’s research has been published in leading academic journals including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Rand Journal of Economics, and the Review of Economic Studies. Professor Doraszelski is the recipient of numerous grants from the National Science Foundation. He was a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University from 2006 to 2007.

Continue Reading

Research

  • Ulrich Doraszelski, Joseph Harrington, Mark Satterthwaite (Work In Progress), Can Collusion Be Sustained Under Demand Uncertainty and Entry and Exit?.

  • Bryan Bollinger, Ulrich Doraszelski, Kenneth Judd, Ryan McDevitt (2024), The Timing and Location of Entry in Growing Markets: Subgame Perfection at Work, , Rand Journal of Economics, 55 (2), pp. 169-198.

  • Ulrich Doraszelski, Joao F. Gomes, Felix Nockher, Oligopoly dynamics with Financing Frictions.

  • Ulrich Doraszelski and Jordi Jaumandreu, Reexamining the De Loecker & Warzynski (2012) method for estimating markups.

  • David Besanko, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yaroslav Kryukov (2020), Sacrifice tests for predation in a dynamic pricing model: Ordover & Willig (1981) and Cabral & Riordan (1997) meet Ericson & Pakes (1995), International Journal of Industrial Organization , 70 (), pp. 1-20.

  • David Besanko, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yaroslav Kryukov (2019), How Efficient is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment, American Economic Review , 109 (9), pp. 3339-3364.

  • Ulrich Doraszelski and Jordi Jaumandreu (Working), Using Cost Minimization to Estimate Markups.

  • Juan Escobar and Ulrich Doraszelski (2019), Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games, Theoretical Economics, 14 (), pp. 597-646.

  • Ulrich Doraszelski, Katja Seim, Michael Sinkinson, Will Peichun Wang (Forthcoming), Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction.

    Abstract: We explore the sensitivity of the U.S. government's ongoing incentive auction to multi-license ownership by broadcasters. We document significant broadcast TV license purchases by private equity firms prior to the auction and perform a prospective analysis of the effect of ownership concentration on auction outcomes. We find that multi-license holders are able to raise spectrum acquisition costs by 22% by strategically withholding some of their licenses to increase the price for their remaining licenses. A proposed remedy reduces the distortion in payouts to license holders by up to 80%, but lower participation could greatly increase payouts and exacerbate strategic effects.  

  • Ulrich Doraszelski and Kenneth Judd (2019), Dynamic Stochastic Games with Random Moves, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 17 (1), pp. 59-79.

Awards and Honors

  • Dean’s Research Fund, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2010, 2015, 2019 and 2020, 2020
  • NFS Grant No. SES-0924380, “Collaborative Research: Measuring the Bias of Technological Change,” with Jordi Jaumandreu, 2009-2011
  • Clark Fund, Harvard University, 2004 and, 2008
  • NSF Grant No. SES-0617896, “Economic Impacts of Technological Innovations in Product Availability,” with Julie Mortimer, 2006-2009
  • NSF Grant No. SES-0615615, “Collaborative Research on Dynamic Antitrust Policy: Predatory and Limit Pricing in a Model of Learning-by-Doing and Organizational Forgetting,” with David Besanko, 2006-2008
  • EARIE Young Economists’ Essay Award, 2002
  • Dissertation Research Fellowship, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization, Northwestern University, 2000-2001
  • University Fellowship, Northwestern University, 1996-1997
  • Best Graduate Award, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, 1996
  • NSF Grant No. SES-20117068, “Dynamic Strategic Corporate Finance”, with Joao Gomes, 2021-2024
  • Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Grant, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1970

In the News

Knowledge at Wharton

Activity

Latest Research

Ulrich Doraszelski, Joseph Harrington, Mark Satterthwaite (Work In Progress), Can Collusion Be Sustained Under Demand Uncertainty and Entry and Exit?.
All Research

In the News

The FCC’s Spectrum Auction: Can the System Be Gamed?

Owners of multiple TV stations can strategically bid to hike payouts by billions of dollars in the FCC’s upcoming spectrum incentive auction. But there is a partial remedy, Wharton experts say. Read More

Knowledge at Wharton - 3/21/2016
All News